THE BRISBANE LINE

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Fact or fiction? Myth or desperate measure? For more than 75 years the "Brisbane Line" has been argued about, ridiculed, pooh poohed, said to be an excellent idea, said to be a stupid idea, said to have never happened, or if actually contemplated, the result of craven panic. Where is the truth in this long bubbling brew of charge and counter charge?


The popular conception of the Brisbane Line (the term in the WW2 context first coined by General MacArthur) that would be remembered bitterly by Labor Party voters for years to come was a hypothetical marking on the map of Australia arcing from Brisbane to Adelaide. Other versions (which are now said by many to never have existed) wavered between a line from Brisbane to Perth (General MacArthur's brain-snap), a line described by the Darling River (also referred to by MacArthur) and a line around an area resembling a south eastern bulge beginning in Brisbane and concluding in Melbourne. Everything within the bulge would be defended to the last bullet, butcher's knife or pitchfork. Everything outside of the bulge would be rendered useless to an envisioned invading Japanese army. This strategy is as old as war itself and is commonly referred to as a "scorched earth" policy.

What would a devil's advocate have to say about a plan for a withdrawal to the south east and an abandonment of the rest of the continent in the event of a Japanese invasion? How sensible was it? Before any consideration begins, a context is cried out for. These were truly desperate times. In the brief period after the bombing of Pearl Harbor signalled the beginning of the Pacific war, the Japanese Army had rolled juggenaut-like over Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). The fall of the supposedly impregnable Singapore to a numerically inferior force had sent shock-waves radiating out to the rest of the world but nowhere as traumatically as to Britain and Australia. It seemed the invasion of Australia would quickly follow just as irresistibly. And why not? The country was virtually defenceless. Its army had left home - to fight alongside a British army in the Middle East. All that remained in Australia as a martial presence was a hastily rounded up, insufficiently trained and armed militia. Australia's only hope of salvation was American aid which was virtually begged for but initially met with silence. The US was committed to a "Europe first" policy, which is not to say it had completely put the Pacific War on hold but it was low priority. Moreover, the Pacific plan most appealing to the US government was a direct thrust across the great expanse of ocean as proposed by Admiral Nimitz. The possible fall of Australia was not a fundamental concern. (Although the dismal fate of seven million whites would be regrettable.)

Given all these factors, it would be difficult to not conclude that a circling of the wagons was the only realistic course of action. Although it appears not to have occurred to Australia's political leaders, its military leaders were not completely unaware of the strategic value of heading the Japanese off in New Guinea, but how was this to be done given the state of Australia's military nakedness. One of the few rays of hope was offered by Australia's prime minister, John Curtain finally tearing the 6th and 7th Divisions out of Churchill's clutches and they were heading home albeit perilously devoid of air-cover. Even as the ships bearing the troops were underway, Churchill tried to divert them to the Burmese fiasco where they would have been surely destroyed - either killed or taken as POW's, not much better.

It seemed, with the factor of thousands of miles of coastline impossible to defend added to the country's other woes, a Japanese invasion could not be prevented. In light of all these considerations, a complete withdrawal to the main population centres of the south east, was, if not a good option, the only option. Its main draw-back of course was that Japanese bombers operating from outside the redoubt could bomb the defenders into surrender. Tasmanians would also have been unhappy about being told they were the Australians with the least to worry about. The counter to this would be that, knowing the Japanese, the island would be taken and its residents held to hostage. Surrender, or these people are going the way of the Tasmanian Tiger.




Unknown throughout all of this was that the Japanese high command had decided against invading Australia, Australians or anyone else of course not being privy to their plans. With their lines of supply already stretched to breaking point, they knew they would be biting off more than they could chew. Although the Japanese didn't exactly despise the idea of terrorising Australians with a fear of invasion, the real strategy was to cut Australia off from America so it could not be used as a springboard for American attacks into the underbelly of Japanese power, which is exactly what happened after negative results of the battles of the Coral Sea and Milne Bay had foiled Japanese plans for erecting a barrier between Australia and the US. Contrary to popular belief, the Americans did not come to Australia to save it. America came purely out of self-interest - to launch a second front. If in the process the north or north west of the continent had been lost to the enemy, then so be it. That could be sorted out later. This should have been easily digested food for thought for a never ending parade of Australian politicians who have placed implicit faith in an American alliance.

Now that Australia could relax a little, it was back to politics-as-usual. Right throughout the perceived threat of invasion the idea of a national government comprising the best from both sides of politics had been a moot point because of the toxic animosity between the Labor Party and the United Australia Party. It was about to become even more toxic. Edward "Eddy" Ward was a Labor Party member of the House of Representatives and was known as a "bomb thrower".

He was about to throw a block-buster. Midway through 1943, he let it be known to a stunned and soon to be outraged public that he had discovered plans drawn up by the previous UAP-CP (United Australia Party- Country Party) government that would see the greater part of the country abandoned to Japanese invaders complemented by a scorched earth policy. Adding fuel to the fire, he went as far as to say that no plans had been made for the evacuation of this area. Inhabitants unable to make it to safety off their own bat would be left to their fate. Ward was alone in making these accusations but no effort was made by his prime minister or other members to restrain him. Menzies, the then leader of the Opposition of course vehemently denied these accusations. The episode culminated in Curtain calling for a royal commission during which no evidence to support Ward's claims were uncovered. But the damage was done. The Labor Party went on to win a record majority in the election held that year.

Paul Burns, author of The Brisbane Line Controversy: Political Opportunism Versus National Security, 1942 - 1945, is excoriating of all involved in this tawdry piece of history. He says it "is a tale of political deceit, manipulation, cowardice and betrayal by politicians on all sides for electoral gain, involving shameless exploitation of public fears of Japanese invasion. It culminated in the callous scapegoating of innocent army officers whose only crime was their desire to defend their country in the most effective way possible." He stops barely short of charging treason.

One is reminded of Adolph Hitler's take on party politics in Mein Kampf: "By the introduction of parliamentarianism, democracy produced an abortion of filth and fire, creative fire, which, however seems to have died out."

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"The parliament passes some acts of decree which may have the most devastating consequences, yet nobody bears the responsibility for it. Nobody can be called to account. For surely one cannot say that a Cabinet discharges its responsibility when it retires after having brought about a catastrophe."

The catastrophe in the context of Australia in the forties was that for years both sides of politics had been criminally negligent in allowing the countries defences to atrophy to the point of defencelessness.  

Burns goes on to reveal the rank hypocrisy of Ward and his quietly complicit Labor Party cronies. In 1942, just after it had won power from the UAP-CP coalition the Labor Party had implemented an exact replica of the retreat-to-the-south-east strategy for which they would be denouncing their political opponents.

In a stroke of pure serendipity, historian Sue Rosen, when doing research on Murray River Red Gum forests on behalf of the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service in January 2012 when she discovered a file that had little to do with Red Gums or indeed any other kind of tree. As she recounts, it instead:

" ... detailed the "Wartime Activities of the Forestry Commission by a subcommittee headed by NSW Forestry Commissioner, EHF Swain. Glancing through the first few pages, I read phrases such as 'Total War' and 'Battle Stations for All' and 'Defence in Depth'. As I read on, it dawned on me that I had found buried treasure. These somewhat tatty, yellowing papers detailed plans for implementing in New South Wales the "scorched earth" policy adopted in 1942 by the Curtain government amid fears of on imminent Japanese invasion." Perhaps in an effort to avoid startling the horses too much, the "Scorched Earth Code" would become somewhat of a euphemism: the "Denial of Resources to the Enemy Policy. The entire package was stored in readiness by the Curtain Labor Government. And quite a package it was. The reproduced documents would fill an entire book produced by Rosen entitled, "Scorched Earth: Australia's secret plan for total war under Japanese invasion in World War 11.

Although Paul Burns splits semantic hairs in avoiding a conclusion that a Brisbane Line in fact existed exactly as "Bomb Thrower" Ward presented it, one would need to be on reality-dissolving drugs in order to claim that the myth had been "busted".  All that had been busted was the reputations of Australian military leaders, primarily Home Forces Commander, Lieutenant-General, Ivan Mackay, a highly decorated officer from WW1, who had conducted a comprehensive study on behalf of the Menzies/Fadden government in regard to Australia's defences vis-a-vis the forces Japan could throw at them and had concluded that it would be impossible for Australia on its own to resist an invasion. Throughout the duration of the war, Mackay would never be given the responsibilities his natural talents and abilities should have ensured him receiving. A black cloud of "defeatism" dogged him.

If history had taken a turn for the worse and Australia had have been invaded, it would be fair to conclude the Japanese would have had to pay dearly for their stay here. Napoleon's dictum that men fight harder to keep their country than men trying to take it from them would have been the Australian's first advantage. Secondly, the populace was well armed - far better than it is today - and both men and women knew how to shoot. Thirdly, the enemy would have been a long way from home in a naturally inhospitable environment far different to any they were used to. Fourthly, apart from a few "aliens" the population was totally homogeneous. The people were all in it together. Whatever their fate, it would be shared. If death were to be that fate, little doubt exists that the Australian people would have died hard. An Asian Australia was their worst possible nightmare. Little could they have imagined that in less than half a century traitorous governments would be well on their way to transforming the country into what they most feared and hated.

It's difficult to resist speculating on how it would have panned out if Australia had been then "multicultural". All those dual nationalities. How long would it have taken for all those so situated to decide that the Australian side of the equation was the one they could do without? Moreover, how long would it have taken for passages to be booked to places which, after one had thought about it, were after all their true homes. Australia though had been a nice place to visit.